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I am very pleased to be able to present this paper to a new international audience of experts 
on the use of lay people in legal systems. I am always excited about what we can learn from 
one another, internationally. In 2014, I was privileged to lecture the California Judges 
Association, in Cambridge. I was keen to learn about the procedures for a defendant opting 
for a bench trial and the use of alternate jurors, neither of which exists in Wales and England. 
They were keen to learn how E&W had eliminated peremptory challenges and almost all 
challenges for cause many years ago! 
This paper revisits some of the arguments I have previously made, including those in a meta-
analysis of jury research for Lord Justice Auld’s 2001 Criminal Courts Review.1 Our paper’s 
recommendations were explored and adopted by Auld LJ. Some were followed by the Labour 
Government in their 2002 White Paper, Justice for All.
2
 The main achievement, from a point 
I made in 1991 and reiterated in 2001, was the abolition of the long lists of people who were 
statutorily “ineligible” for jury service and “excusable as of right”, by the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003. As the press release said  
“Judges, politicians, vicars, bishops, doctors and Lords will, from today, be able to sit 
on a jury…the legislative changes significantly increase the number of people who 
can now do jury service… Around 480,000 people are summoned for jury service 
annually. Previously, less than half (about 200,000) were eligible.”3 
This paper reignites the 2001 recommendations that have not, thus far, been fruitful. Since 
2002, I have had the benefit of sitting on the bench observing the working lives of all types of 
judge.
4
 In the Crown Court, I was naturally watching the judge and jury at work.  
1. Giving the Crown Court defendant the right to trial by judge alone, “jury 
waiver” 
As a matter of principle, I believe the defendant should have a moral and a legal right to 
choose judge-alone trial (“bench trial”, in American legal English) in the Crown Court, as he 
can in many of England’s common law daughter jurisdictions.  In 1991, I argued that we 
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could not be said to have a “right” to jury trial, in constitutional or jurisprudential terms, other 
than in “either way” offences, where the defendant can choose Crown Court judge and jury 
trial, or trial in the magistrates’ court by three lay justices. Depending on location, he may be 
tried, exceptionally, by a district judge (magistrates’ court) but he has no choice 
“What of indictable offences? Here, I must appear before the Crown Court, where my 
only choice is as to plea. My only right is as to trial. I cannot choose to be tried by judge 
alone, as I could in the United States”.5 
Two years later, Zander found that 30 per cent of 499 Crown Court defendants surveyed said 
that they would have chosen trial by judge alone, had the law permitted this.
6
 My argument 
was cited by Jackson and Doran in their thoroughly researched and very persuasive 1997 
article, “The Case for Jury Waiver”.7 That year, I also reiterated this argument.8 I drew 
attention to Schulhofer’s famous article on the Philadelphia bench trials9 that I had observed a 
decade after him.  
In 2000, I sent those articles to Auld LJ and asked him to observe bench trials in the USA. He 
did so and also visited Canada, where he found that in some provinces, there was a very high 
uptake of bench trials. In his Review, having examined the law in the USA, Canada and New 
Zealand, he recommended that:  
“defendants, with the consent of the court after hearing representations from both 
sides, should be able to opt for trial by judge alone in all cases now tried on 
indictment…” (p. 181). 
This was adopted in Justice for All
10
 and accordingly, the Government included such a clause 
in the Criminal Justice Bill 2003. Disappointingly, it was removed at the eleventh hour
11
 after 
weak and ill-informed debate.  Parliamentarians, like some lawyers and probably members of 
the public, simply cannot imagine why a defendant would opt for a non-jury trial and they 
have no idea that this right is taken for granted in other English speaking countries, yet Auld 
LJ had carefully set out six common reasons why defendants make this choice.  
 Factually or legally complex cases, where the defendant wants a tribunal who 
understands the case; 
 defendants with technical defences;  
 defendants who have attracted public opprobrium for repugnant offences (sex or 
violence), who expect a judge to be objective;  
                                                          
5
 “The lamp that shows that freedom lives – is it worth the candle?” [1991] Crim. L.R. 740, at p. 742. 
6
 The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Crown Court Study, Research Study No 19 (HMSO 1993), at p. 
172. 
7
 [1997] Crim. L.R. 155 and their footnoted publications, notably Judge Without Jury – Diplock Trials in the 
Adversary System (Oxford 1995). 
8
 “An Essay on the Importance and Neglect of the Magistracy” [1997] Crim. L.R. 627 at 642. 
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 R. Bennett, “Sacrifice of trial by jury plans saves justice Bill” The Times, November 21, 2003. It was dropped 
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 defendants who have suffered adverse publicity; 
 cases turning on identification or confession evidence;  
 where judges are known to local practitioners and trusted to try cases competently and 
fairly.
12
 
When I explain to lawyers and judges in the UK why a defendant might opt for a bench trial, 
I often give a practical example, reported in UK news in 1994. A woman in San Francisco 
whose daughter died of morbid obesity was tried for her homicide. She chose a bench trial, 
fearing that all potential jurors would be hostile to her. The Bar opposed Auld’s 
recommendation in these terms: 
“Judges are likely under these proposals to have a diet of unpopular sexual 
allegations; unattractive middle or upper class fraudsters; and cases where the defence 
lawyers hope for a technical victory…such opportunistic excursions…so that 
defendants can seek to exploit the perceived advantages of the professional judge 
[risk] bringing the law into disrepute”.13 
This conjures an image of juries creaming off the “attractive” defendants, such as armed 
robbers and terrorists. There is no evidence that the judge-alone option has brought the law 
into disrepute throughout North America, Canada,
14
 New Zealand
15
 and those Australian 
states and territories where the bench trial option is permitted.
16
 Aside from the cultural 
arrogance of some English lawyers, one problem in England and Wales is a fear of the 
unknown, coupled with ignorance of comparative criminal procedure and even how the 
English legal system works. Many barristers and consequently Crown Court circuit judges 
simply cannot imagine how a bench trial works, how a criminal judge can be an arbiter of 
fact and law, as I discovered during the ten years I spent researching judges’ working lives. 
As one circuit judge asked, “What’ll happen in the courtroom when a judge retires to bring in 
his verdict?”17 Many are oblivious of the work of their counterparts, district judges in the 
magistrates’ courts, let alone lay justices conducting bench trials. Magistrates’ bench trials 
include some serious adult matters in the “either-way” category and, hidden away in the 
youth court, multi-handed robberies, gang rapes and incidents related to gang-warfare.
18
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Auld’s recommendation did receive some weighty support, however, notably from The Law 
Society, then representing eight times as many lawyers as the Bar Council, provided that the 
defendant’s decision was “an informed one, taken after legal advice”.19  
As I consider that the defendant should have a moral right to opt for trial by judge alone, I 
would not allow the judge to veto that choice, unlike Auld LJ. I am aware that most circuit 
judges are very strongly in favour of jury trial
20
 not least because they would not want to 
determine guilt or innocence themselves.
21
 Judges’ preferences do not trump my argument 
that the defendant should have a moral right to a bench trial.  
There is no need to research this issue again. Doran and Jackson left no stone unturned in 
examining the moral and mechanical issues and international comparative criminal 
procedure. The only need is for critics and especially parliamentarians to be better informed 
and to understand that this right is normal in other common law countries and that we already 
have bench trials operating in the magistrates’ court, including in some very serious cases. 
There is no need to worry about how bench trials can function, practically and procedurally. 
Ask the 21,600 English and Welsh lay justices and 142 district judge (magistrates’ courts) 
and their legal advisers. Incidentally, bench trials have the advantage of a reasoned verdict.  
Although the magistrates’ court is not a court of record, magistrates and DJMCs decided to 
give reasons from 1998, in anticipation of the Human Rights Act coming into force in 2000 
and triggering the Convention’s Art 6 requirement for reasoned decisions. 
2. Alternate or Extra Jurors 
In the 2001 paper for Auld L.J., citing Baroness Helena Kennedy Q.C., we recommended that 
alternate jurors should be sworn in for long trials, to insure against a trial’s collapsing 
because of juror problems.   
“Given the expense of some long trials, even swearing in two alternates would be 
worthwhile.  It is common practice to use alternates in the United States...In four 
Australian jurisdictions, up to six reserve jurors may be sworn in.  This is not yet 
permissible in Canada, Scotland or New Zealand, nor in English law.”22 
Our suggestion was discussed by Auld LJ at pp. 142 – 143. He cited a fraud trial that was 
forced to proceed with nine jurors, as is permissible in England and Wales. Incidentally, 
although juror problems did not cause the 2005 collapse of the Jubilee Line fraud trial, two 
jurors had already been discharged – one for an allegation relating to benefit fraud and 
another had become pregnant – and a third was “reluctant to attend court unless a problem he 
had with his employer over pensions payments was resolved by the Department for 
Constitutional Affairs”, which was impossible. 23Auld recommended that judges be 
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empowered to swear in alternate or reserve jurors in long cases, where they consider it 
appropriate.  This was not, however, followed in the Justice for All legislative plans.  
 
The safest procedure for using alternates is to swear in, say, 14 jurors then use a ballot to 
select the final 12 at the pre-retirement stage. This, however, raises the problem that the 
discharged jurors have contributed to discussions throughout the trial in a decision for which 
they do not have final responsibility. This is obviated if the extra two simply remain in the 
jury so that on the very rare occasions where a judge sees fit to swear extra jurors and the jury 
remains intact, the verdict emanates from a jury of 14, enhancing its legitimacy. There is a 
large body of research on optimum group size for decision making and a group of 14 has 
benefits and drawbacks, as does a group of 12. The pros and cons of all “alternate juror” 
procedures have been thorough canvassed recently in Canada and New Zealand. 
24
 
Jury boxes only have space for 12 jurors. To reject this proposal on such a ground would be a 
case of the tail wagging the dog. There is no reason to make bigger jury boxes throughout the 
court estate. A few courtrooms could be equipped with an extra box for two, complete with 
IT and a monitor and the jurors could take turns in sitting in the extra box. Simply as a cost 
comparator, the Jubilee Line trial collapse wasted £25 million and 21 month of the jurors’ 
lives. 
3. Pre-trial case summaries 
In 2001, we recommended to Auld LJ that, where possible, juries should be given a simple 
pre-trial summary of the issues, because of the illogicality that I had remarked on, as a 1990 
juror, of receiving all the trial information (evidence) before being told what to do with it.
25
 If 
a group of people is expected to take a decision, it is abnormal and unhelpful to provide them 
with all of the information first, and then to tell them afterwards what decisions are expected 
of them, especially when the delivery of the information takes days or weeks. We quoted 
Grove, citing an American judge that it was like:  
  
“telling jurors to watch a baseball game and decide who won without telling them 
what the rules are until the end of the game”.26  
 
Auld LJ adopted our recommendation in his Review.
27
 Sixteen of the 27 circuit judges 
interviewed on this topic for Sitting in Judgment were either opposed, or considered that it 
would only be of limited use in, say, complex trials. Almost all gave the same reason, “Issues 
shift during the course of the trial”. Nevertheless, Lord Justice Auld had contemplated this: 
the agreed statement could be amended and approved. Several judges considered the pre-trial 
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summary ought to be done in the prosecutor’s opening speech. Of those judges in favour, 
however, some had already done it:  
 
“I see no problem in giving sort of mini-directions before the trial starts or before the 
speeches—‘Members of the jury, you will be invited to consider this’…I may say to 
the jury ‘The only issue that I anticipate that you may have to decide is whether he 
had these drugs with him and he intended to supply them to someone else’.” 
 
If the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was working as intended, resulting in fuller defence 
statements, then surely the provision of a pre-trial summary of the issues would be even more 
feasible now, than when we made this observation in 2001. Lord Chief Justice Phillips 
repeated this point in 2007, in a speech, “Trusting the Jury”: 
 
“Sir Robin Auld in his report recommended some more radical changes to the nature 
of jury trial. Issues should be identified before trial, with better use being made of the 
defence statement. At the start of the trial the judge should give the jury a summary of 
the case and the questions that they will have to decide, supported by a written aide 
memoire, agreed with counsel before-hand. The jury should be told the nature of the 
charges, a short narrative of the agreed facts and a summary of the facts in issue and a 
list of the likely questions for their decision”.28 
 
The 2010 Bench Book, Directing the Jury, which was supposed to be a response to his 
concerns, is silent on this precise point, as is a 2009 training guide written by His Honour 
Judge Inigo Bing, then a Crown Court judge.
29
 In 2010, Moses L.J. reiterated the suggestions 
of Auld and Phillips:  
 
“…defence counsel should be required to tell the jury what the defence is at the 
outset…there is some superstition…that to require the defence to explain its defence 
somehow infringes the right to silence. For an inexplicable reason, the statutory 
obligation to update the statement has not yet been brought into force. The statute limits 
the power of the judge to show the jury this statement to those cases where it would help 
the jury to understand the case or to resolve any issue in the case. (S. 6E(5)(b)). It is not 
possible to envisage any properly drafted defence statement which would not be of 
assistance to the jury.”  
 
One problem here though is that my recent work on case management in ten of the 71 Crown 
Courts showed that by the time of the plea and case management hearing, in some courts, 
defence statements were missing in most cases, because of prosecution disclosure failures, or, 
in any court, they sometimes amounted to a solicitor’s template asking questions rather than 
giving much information.
30
 Nevertheless, in an eleventh court in 2007, which specialised in 
serious fraud and other complex cases, the resident judge said that he had demanded full 
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statements for years and showed me a 45 page statement. I observed him in a case 
management hearing as he kept rejecting a statement that was not explicit enough. Strict trial 
management in cases like this, from 2005, and demands for thorough preparation, appeared to 
have generated a culture change, according to nine fraud judges.
31
 There is no reason why, 
regardless of the defence statement, strict case managing judges cannot insist on a pre-trial 
outline, agreed by both sides, which would be helpful to the jury. Jurors, like everyone else, 
build up a story in their heads of what went on in the case.
32
 They need an outline of the 
prosecution’s story, and outline of the defence story and they need to know what facts are 
agreed. This third point, coupled with robust judicial case management, might also serve to 
focus lawyers’ minds on what evidence they do not need to bore the jury with relentlessly in 
the trial, such as a simple trial described in Sitting in Judgment where the defendant admitted 
shooting his wife at point blank range. The only contest was whether it was accidental but the 
jury suffered slow video footage of the entire house twice, with the deceased sitting up in bed, 
plus still photographs, then the post mortem report, in grisly detail, then the re-enactment of 
the entire unedited transcripts of the police interrogations. 
33
 The 1999-2001 New Zealand 
Law Commission jury research project identified complaints by jurors about the absence of 
guidance at the start of the trial about what were the real issues. Young, one of the 
researchers, supported our argument that jurors create “an evolving story which makes sense 
to them” so “the initial frame which jurors adopt in order to construct their “story” is 
important”. Young said research had perhaps contributed to judges’ increasing use of written 
material and certainly encouraged them to “give reasonably elaborate directions and advice at 
the commencement of trials”: 
 
“It is this frame which enables jurors to select from and interpret the evidence as it begins 
to emerge…The New Zealand research identifies many complaints by jurors about the 
absence of clear guidance at the start of the trial as to the real issues in the case. In the 
absence of such guidance, jurors are likely to focus on what, in the end, turns out not to 
be in dispute and not to realise in a timely way the importance of what may be the critical 
evidence”. 34 
 
They supported Auld L.J.’s recommendation for a written pre-trial instruction identifying the 
issues. 
4. Encouraging jurors to ask questions 
In 2001, we reported that jurors who had published stories of their jury service in England 
and Wales frequently mentioned a strong inhibition against asking questions. This confirmed 
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Zander and Henderson’s Crown Court Study.35 44 per cent of 8,194 jurors had wanted to ask 
questions but under a fifth had done so. Matthews, Hancock and Briggs made the same 
point.
36
 67 per cent of their sample had wanted to ask questions. Many felt uncomfortable 
about holding up the trial. Some felt they were actively discouraged. Some felt it would be 
embarrassing. In the observational research with judges reported in Sitting in Judgment, no 
judge suggested to a jury that they might ask questions. Judges neither encouraged nor 
discouraged it. In some American jurisdictions, it is recognised that jurors experience this 
inhibition so they are actively encouraged. Although English and Welsh jurors are told that 
they may ask questions, in 2001 we recommended that it may be helpful to alert judges to this 
inhibition and to encourage them to ask the jury at certain points in the trial whether they 
needed to ask questions. Matthews et al recommended that 15 minutes per day be set aside 
for this. Many jury reforms have been pioneered in Arizona, as a result of research. Jurors are 
told in their orientation video that they may ask questions of witnesses, provided that these 
are in writing and submitted to the judge.
37
 Similarly, English jurors are told in the YouTube 
video “Your Role as a Juror” that “if at any point you need further explanation or want to ask 
a question you can do so by passing a note to the judge, via an usher”, but it is not clear 
whether this means “at any point in the judge’s summing up”. Clearly it does not but it could 
be so interpreted by a lay person, as it stands. Ample prior research has demonstrated that 
asking questions and taking notes encourages jurors to be active and alert, avoiding the 
“passive sponge” effect that we discussed in 2001. 
5. Written Directions and Simplifying Directions 
There is something unreal about having to reiterate a call for written directions when the 
intended audience, the jury, has progressed beyond the era of reading hard-copy material. 
According to 2014 research, “Britons spend more time using tech than sleeping”.38  The 
principle of orality in English and Welsh criminal jury trial runs deep. In 2001, relying on 
previous international research, we recommended that judges be encouraged to give written 
directions to jurors and a series of written questions. The suggestion on written directions 
goes back at least to the 1970s LSE jury project.
39
 Auld LJ contemplated ideal directions at 
some length and adopted this recommendation. He cited Professor E. Griew, who suggested a 
series of written questions, with minimal reference to the law.
 40
 Auld said the jury should not 
direct the jury on the law, save as implied in the questions of fact he puts to them. 
41
  In 2001, 
we did not ascertain how many judges did this. In researching Sitting in Judgment (2011), it 
transpired that the practice of giving written directions was much more common than the 
2001 paper anticipated. 23 of the 27 circuit judges questioned on this point said they had 
given agreed written directions. (Two were newly appointed and had not yet had the 
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 Crown Court Study for the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Research Study No 19. 
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chance).
42
 Most supplied copies of examples and it was clear that the directions usually took 
the form of a sequence of questions, or sequences following alternative routes, rather like a 
flow-chart. Judges did not give written directions in routine cases where the issues were 
simple but they generally gave them in murder, reckless arson, rape, joint enterprises and 
dangerous driving. Judges showed me how they prepared written directions in murder cases. 
Nevertheless, written directions were the exception. Frequency varied from one Crown Court 
resident (managing judge) who had given them twice in his career to another resident who 
said “I do it all the time” and certainly in every murder case. Both conducted many murder 
trials. One judge said that he was becoming increasingly willing to give them. Two judges 
outside the research sample said, in 2007, that they gave written directions in every case. One 
had been influenced by a 2006 article on the subject by Judge Madge,
43
 who had tried written 
directions in all cases and reported the results: quicker verdicts, fewer questions and more 
convictions.  
 
Why do jurors need written directions? In a 2010 case simulation study with 797 real jurors, 
Cheryl Thomas found that only 31 per cent accurately identified two questions the judge had 
set them to determine self-defence but 48 per cent of a sub-sample of 72 jurors who received 
an additional one-page aide-memoire were able to correctly identify the questions.
44
 In the 
first stage of her current UCL jury project, she found that 70 per cent of 239 real jurors said 
they had received written directions and 100 per cent of that group had found them helpful. 
Of the 30 per cent who did not receive them, 85 per cent said they would have found written 
directions helpful.
45
 Continuing his 2007 endorsement of the Auld Review, Lord Phillips 
went on: 
 
“At the end of the evidence the judge should no longer direct the jury on the law, nor 
sum up the evidence in detail. He should remind the jury of the issues and of the 
evidence relevant to them and, of course, of the defence. He should put to the jury a 
series of written factual questions, the answers to which would lead to a verdict of 
guilty or not guilty. These proposals were made seven years ago. They have not been 
taken up. The time may come when they receive further consideration.” 
 
In the Judicial Communications Office response to Cheryl Thomas’s 2010 research report 
and recommendation that jury directions should be simplified, they said “The Judicial Studies 
Board now recommends that written directions be given to juries in all but the most simple of 
cases”. I would expect that if I were to re-interview my sample of judges, they would have 
increased their use of written directions.  I would also expect that all new judges and 
recorders (part-timers) would give written directions in some, if not most, cases. All judges in 
the Sitting in Judgment research asked advocates to approve written directions before offering 
them to the jury. By doing so, they protected themselves from disapproval by the Court of 
Appeal and the consequent quashing of a conviction. One novice told me of an instance 
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where the advocates had disagreed with her proposals and she had redrafted the directions 
and then checked them with the resident (managing) judge.  
 
In 2001, incidentally, I also suggested that certain basic instructions, such as on the burden 
and standard of proof could be placed on jury room walls. Why not do this?  
 
Not before time, serious large-scale research into jury directions is being undertaken by 
Professor Cheryl Thomas, in the UCL jury project. She is looking at the form and frequency 
of written directions, “as well as looking at which form(s) of written directions is clearer and 
easier for jurors to understand - routes to verdict, bullet point summaries, full transcripts, etc. 
The findings should be available early in the new year” (email August 2014). This is 
extremely welcome. Crucially, it is perfectly clear since 2011 that the sort of “route to 
verdict” directions and questions now given by many judges and which we recommended in 
2001 are necessary to satisfy the defendant’s fair trial rights under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as defined in Strasbourg jurisprudence, in Taxquet v. Belgium, 
46
 as explained by Spencer:  
 
“Whilst stating that the need for reasoned decisions applies even with lay juries, the 
Grand Chamber accepted that it could be met in other ways than by requiring the jury 
to provide a reasoned judgment in the same way as a professional judge. One possible 
way, it said, was by giving the jury a set of “precise, unequivocal questions” to 
answer, so providing “a framework on which the verdict is based”. In France this 
already happens, at least in some cases, but this had not been done in Belgium in the 
case in hand. Another way, it said, was by “directions or guidance provided by the 
presiding judge to the jurors on the legal issues arising or the evidence adduced”, 
which is of course what happens in the UK and in Ireland.”47 
 
Auld LJ went further than this and would have required jurors to publicly state their reasons. 
He also sought an end to jury equity (the power to nullify). Sadly this caused such outrage 
and antipathy that it sounded the death knell to a good part of his report and it lost all 
credibility to some commentators. 
 
In our meta-analysis of jury research we concluded that juries have difficulty in 
understanding the direction on the standard of proof and we said the word “sure” should be 
eliminated from the direction, because research indicated that it inevitably sends some people 
looking for absolute proof.  To my alarm, since 2011, the word “sure” is the only requirement 
in the direction on the standard of proof. The standard of proof throughout the common law 
world is “beyond reasonable doubt” (BRD), yet in England, the mother of all common law 
systems, worldwide, we appear to have eliminated BRD from the instruction. To require 
jurors to be “sure” is a nonsense. They cannot be sure. They were not witnesses. Even some 
defendants cannot be sure of whether they committed the actus reus or had the required mens 
rea as they were intoxicated at the time of the alleged offence.  
 
As for simplifying directions, In our 2001 paper, we had recommended that specimen jury 
directions be simplified with expert help of linguists and psycholinguists, as in some states in 
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the US, and we expressed concern that current specimen directions  responded to the Court of 
Appeal’s requirements and had not been “road tested” on real people. The 2010 Crown Court 
Bench Book Directing the Jury (Judiciary website) tries to change the judicial approach and 
to stop some judges slavishly following the specimens. It explains the law’s requirements, 
then presents examples. These have still not been tested on non-lawyers (they were drafted by 
judges again) but simplifying some instructions seems an impossible task when the law is so 
complex. For example, the section on a defendant’s failure to mention facts he later relies on 
(exercising the right of silence) amounts to 9.5 pages, including a two-page suggested 
direction. There is another large section on how to instruct the jury on a defendant’s failure to 
account for evidence. The 2010 Bench Book may result in directions being more varied but it 
in no way guarantees that they will be more comprehensible to juries. By 2011, it was 
thought necessary to produce a Crown Court Bench Book Companion, also drafted by judges. 
48
 This is said not to replace the Specimen Directions, in the sense that forms of words are not 
provided. It encourages individually crafted directions.  So the specimen directions are done 
away with and instead we rely on the skills of individual judges to explain the lists of 
everything necessary to the jury in plain language, meaning, I suggest, “plain language 
understandable by the least articulate juror”. Daphne Perry, barrister turned plain English 
consultant, pointed out that while encouraging “plain English”, the 2010 Bench Book 
suggests judges should direct jurors in such terms as “oral evidence”, “he gave an account”, 
“you will appreciate that”.49 As Moses LJ said “It should not be forgotten that however clear 
the new directions are to a lawyer, they are in a foreign tongue to a member of the jury”.  
6. Summing up on the Evidence 
One questioned raised regularly is whether judges in England and Wales should continue to 
sum up on the evidence, for the jury. The issue is under scrutiny by Leveson LJ in his current 
review of efficiency in criminal proceedings, perhaps prompted by the famous speech by his 
Court of Appeal brother, Moses LJ, “Summing Down the Summing Up”50 In neighbouring 
Scotland, judges rarely sum up. In the USA, the curb on judges commenting on the evidence 
goes to the very root of the Constitution and the history of America. It is seldom remembered 
now but repugnance at colonial judges’ power over juries was just as much a spark to the 
American revolutionary war of independence as taxation without representation. Modern 
American judges and lawyers are deeply suspicious when they observe English judges 
summing up. Their suspicion has a historic basis. The very purpose of the summing-up was 
not to remind the jury of the evidence, but, from 1836, when counsel were permitted to 
address the jury, to comment.
51
 Modern trial judges almost certainly do not know that. They 
sit in court with the Court of Appeal metaphorically “sitting on their shoulders”.52 The Court 
of Appeal in London is hyperactive and has become increasingly prescriptive about judicial 
utterances and what constitutes a fair trial.  Judge Madge examined the appellate case law in 
2006 and observed that it was customary for judges to start with the “mantra”, “If I appear to 
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express any views or comments about the evidence, do not accept them, unless you agree 
with them”.53 
 
Regardless of the arguments above, in our paper for Auld LJ we were simply concerned with 
how juries could be helped in performing their function. It is conceivable that a summing up 
helps the jury, especially as some jurors do not take notes and those who do are not 
necessarily experienced note-takers. In 1993, Zander found that 19 per cent of 6,728 jurors 
thought their task would have been “much harder” without the summing up and this rose to 
34 per cent in trials over a week long. A further 33 per cent thought their task would have 
been “a little harder”.54 In New Zealand, where judges traditionally sum-up on the evidence, 
research on real jurors demonstrated that some still suffered difficulties with recall and 
comprehension.
55
 In work-shadowing judges in my research from 2002, I asked judges to 
show me how they drafted their summings-up and to comment on this in their interview. 
They demonstrated how they prepared the summary of the evidence day-by-day as the trial 
progressed, from their longhand notes. Some explained that it was time consuming to sum-up 
in a relevant and concise manner. Merely reciting everything in one’s notes was regarded as a 
bad technique of judges of yesteryear. 
 
“Someone said … the ideal is to have no more than one hour [for every] week of 
evidence … most summing-ups are too long because people haven’t taken the time to 
make them shorter.” 
 
“You have got to be able to analyse and organise material. If you are going to help a 
jury… it is no good just reading through your notebook. I saw this 20 years ago … 
horrendous.” 
 
“I often work at home in the evening … as the trial is progressing. It is only at the end 
that the issues…and the pattern become clear and you can pick out what is important, 
so you are left with a massive workload at the end.” 
 
“I was summing-up for most of the weekend on this big contract killing. All of that 
work is now down the drain as I had to abort the trial. The most boring part is reading 
through the evidence and highlighting the parts of interest … You can’t just read it 
from your notebook because it has to be tailored to what the issues are in the end, and 
that is very time consuming.” 
 
“I really enjoy…say, at the end of a case that lasts a fortnight…to sum it up in less 
than an hour and a half, to have distilled it into a series of issues and to present it to a 
jury in a digested and balanced way which I hope helps them … I enjoy creating a 
balanced résumé and telling the story to the jury in a way that brings it to life yet 
helps them with their decisions.” 
 
In 2001, we recommended that in summing-up, judges “should be told not to recite their 
notes but to draw attention to the main points, to areas of conflict and to how the law applies 
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to the issues of evidence”. The research judges that I work-shadowed after this date clearly 
endeavoured to do this and judges’ interviews acknowledged the time and care that must be 
taken in preparing a summing-up that is sufficiently brief and focussed to help the jury. In the 
last quotation, the judge was unwittingly confirming what we found to be the psychologists’ 
consensus that jurors operate an internal “cognitive story model” in which they try to make 
sense of the evidence by constructing a feasible story, in their minds. Zander and Henderson, 
in 1993 and Jackson,
56
 in 1996 referred to judges summing-up for the prosecutor or the 
defence
57
 but the judges I observed would have been horrified at this suggestion. They tended 
to see it as an archaic practice. Typically, in 2006, one judge explained this to a group of 
curious American law students, who asked him if he tried to get the jury to acquit or convict.  
 
“If you try and tell a London jury what to do they may well rebel … Nowadays judges 
don’t try and sway a jury. There used to be some judges who were masters at telling 
the jury the verdict they wanted them to bring in.” 
 
I would be astonished to witness this nowadays. While judges may, in law, express an 
opinion, modern circuit judges seem to strive to be neutral, out of a sense of real neutrality 
and fairness, a distaste for the role of fact-arbiter and a realistic fear of being appealed. 
Although I did not question judges on this, I would expect that many would not even realise it 
was legal for them to comment on the evidence.   
 
Young said that as a result of their research, a number of New Zealand judges gave 
transcripts of evidence to juries.
58
 On being asked whether they considered that juries should 
be given access to a trial transcript, 19 of 25 Crown Court judges interviewed on this point in 
Sitting in Judgment thought this a bad idea. They felt jurors would become ‘bogged down’ in 
a “mountain” of paper. Many had experience of reading Livenote instantaneous trial 
transcripts and pointed to the fact that these could generate about 70 pages of transcribed text 
per trial day, which was difficult enough for a judge to cope with, let alone a jury. They 
warned that concentrating on a fragment of the dialogue could give a biased impression of the 
evidence. They felt that judges were there to take notes and juries could ask them to clarify 
testimony if necessary. The job of the juror was, as they saw it, to note the demeanour of 
witnesses. This answer was typical. 
 
“juries are there to sit and watch and listen. Judges miss such a great deal when they 
are… trying to make a note. The great value of the jury is they hardly ever miss a 
trick …I am not happy when I see jurors writing too much down … if they were given 
a transcript … they would be tempted to answer those little questions that sometimes 
have to remain unanswered … combing through it in almost an attempt to review the 
entire case.”  
 
Several judges said the jurors’ job was to watch the witnesses. Of the six judges who were 
prepared to allow jurors access to a transcript, one gave the following reason. 
                                                          
56
 J Jackson, ‘Judicial Responsibility in Criminal Proceedings’ (1996) 49 Current Legal 
Problems 59. 
57
 D Wolchover, ‘Should Judges Sum up on the Facts?’ [1989] Crim LR 781 said ‘judicial 
habits vary’. 
58
 Young, above, 2003, p. 685. 
14 
 
 
“I think otherwise they are very often saying ‘a witness said this or the other’ when 
what they really have in their mind are counsel’s questions and I think that to be a 
good defence advocate you are getting a view of the events across to the jury by way 
of your questions which actually isn’t reflected in the evidence at all.”59 
7. Helping juries with their deliberations 
In our 2001 meta-analysis, we examined the major pieces of research on jury deliberation, 
including the dynamics of negotiation and the difference between evidence-driven and 
verdict-driven juries. The only point we made was that, since the research indicated that 
juries considered the evidence more thoroughly when they were not verdict-driven, it might 
be thought desirable to encourage them to discuss the evidence thoroughly before taking a 
vote. In her 2010 study, Thomas found that 67 per cent of jurors surveyed said they would 
have liked more information on conducting deliberations. In her current UCL jury project, 82 
per cent of 239 jurors said they would like more guidance. The most popular aspects were on 
what do if they were confused about a legal issue, or if something went wrong in 
deliberations, how to ensure that jurors were not unduly pressured into reaching a verdict and 
how to start deliberations. 
60
 In the second stage, these findings will help the trialling of 
deliberation guidance.  
8. Jurors’ engagement, comfort and well-being 
In our 2001 paper, we remarked on the abiding memory of most jurors who had published written 
accounts of the jury service as boredom and waiting around. There is much less of this nowadays. 
Thanks to cutbacks in public spending, jury managers may now only request the number of jurors 
they think they will need so the number summoned has gone down. In 2011-12, when I was 
researching case management, I noticed that the position was often reversed. Judges were often kept 
waiting, with other trial participants on standby, for a jury to become free.  
We also remarked that small discomforts can irritate jurors. For instance we suggested that court 
managers should check courtroom temperatures. Disappointingly, I found in my research on judges at 
least one judge who kept his courtroom temperatures very low, thinking that this would keep jurors 
alert, seemingly oblivious of the fact that cold reduces arousal levels. Worse, I discovered on the 
western circuit that “All courtroom temperatures are controlled from Bristol”. 
We remarked on the experiences of one of us, observing a new jury panel being “welcomed” in a 
London Crown Court and how they were addressed and shepherded around in a disrespectful manner. 
I recommended that all court personnel be taught to be polite to jurors and respect the fact that they 
are making a personal sacrifice for the public good. Auld LJ addressed these points and the need to 
keep jurors informed at all times. Juror satisfaction surveys show high levels of satisfaction and 
routine information is now provided to individual jurors, when they are summoned and is publicly 
available online. The Court Service had assured Auld LJ that jurors were kept well-informed, for 
instance, about when they would be needed in court. In the context of all of this, the report on the 
interviews with the jurors in the collapsed 21 month Jubilee Line fraud trial make depressing reading. 
Sally Lloyd-Bostock found that they felt they were treated as “jury fodder”, borrowing our 2001 
phrase – kept on tap but not informed. They were not told why there were very frequent breaks in the 
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trial so they could not make use of the time off. They complained of having been spoken to like 
children. They wasted long hours travelling to the courthouse needlessly. Most of them suffered 
financially as a result of the trial and it had serious long-term consequences on their employment. 
They were not thanked for their service and, unbelievably, five months after the trial collapse, none 
had been given any explanation.
61
  
Conclusion 
Like any element of procedure, the jury system is still a work in progress. I could have said 
more in this paper. I could have mentioned the problems caused by widening jury 
participation to include police officers and prosecutors. I could have examined the still-too-
high excusal rate and excusal by judges, a phenomenon I discovered in my judge-research. I 
could have said a lot more about jury directions and I am writing a lot more about “beyond 
reasonable doubt”. All of this will have to wait, as this paper is already very long. 
In attending this conference one thing is certain. I will learn an enormous amount from the 
other participants so thank you so much for including me in this CRN! 
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